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LEIBNIZ ON DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE
Robert Sleigh

Leibniz believed that his metaphysical system provided a structure acceptable
to all Christian intellectuals of good will and sound reason, within which the
leading issues of philosophical theology could be given a sharp formulation,
and, at least in some cases, adequately resolved. In this paper, I discuss
Leibniz's treatment of one such issue - God's foreknowledge of contingent
truths, especially contingent truths concerning free actions of creatures. Leibniz aimed to provide an account of divine foreknowledge without recourse
to middle knowledge, as espoused by Molina, or premotion, as espoused by
Banez. I aim to provide an account of his account.
The point of this paper is to say something about Leibniz's account of God's
foreknowledge of contingent truths, especially, contingent truths concerning
free actions of creatures. By my lights the topic is intrinsically interesting,
since it involves one of the best philosophical minds wrestling with a topic
that has vexed philosophers and theologians from at least Augustine's time
to the present. But beyond that, its study allows us some entry into the way
in which Leibniz intermingled metaphysical and theological concerns in his
total system, a matter of considerable importance to those of us who hope to
understand that system and its rationale.
The topic of Leibniz's account of divine foreknowledge is too extensive
for full treatment here. My aim is to block out some of the major items that
need investigation. I do so by concentrating on the claim involved in the
following passage, which concludes paragraph 47 of Leibniz's Theodicy:
in order to explain the foreknowledge of God, we can do without the middle
knowledge of the Molinists, as well as predetermination of the sort that a
Banez or an Alvarez (otherwise authors who are exceedingly profound) has
taught.
The problem of God's foreknowledge of contingent truths concerning future free actions of creatures reached a crescendo in the famous Congregatio
de auxiliis - really two congregations, one presided over by various Cardinals (1598-1601), followed by another presided over by various Popes (16021605). Of course there was much more at stake in the Congregatio de auxiliis
than divergent views concerning God's foreknowledge of free actions of
creatures, but divergent views on that topic - specifically, those associated
with the Jesuit, Molina, on the one hand, and the Dominican, Banez, on the
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other - were central to the controversy therein debated. In almost every text
in which Leibniz wrote about the matter of God's foreknowledge of free
actions of creatures Molina and Banez - or their respective 17th century
successors - are in evidence. There were radical voices speaking to this
problem in the 17th century: some who denied creaturely freedom, others
who accepted creaturely free actions but who denied God's foreknowledge
of them. When the occasion arose, Leibniz derisively separated himself from
these radical voices, affirming the basic parameters of the problem common
to Molina and Banez, among many others. In the first section of this paper I
outline these basic parameters from Leibniz's point of view. In the second
section I formulate the main elements of the debate between Molina and
Banez, as Leibniz understood that debate. In the third section I discuss an
accommodation that Leibniz was prepared to offer the Molinists concerning
middle knowledge. I claim that the alleged accommodation would have been
of little interest to the Molinists. In the fourth and fifth sections I discuss
Leibniz's critical reaction to the positions of Banez and Molina, respectively.
In the sixth (and last) section I consider Leibniz's account of divine foreknowledge of contingent counterfactual conditionals - a case that is particularly sticky for him.l

I
A primary goal of Leibniz's philosophical theology was the formulation of a
metaphysical structure acceptable to all Christian intellectuals of good will
and sound reason, within which the leading issues of philosophical theology
could be given a sharp formulation, and, at least in some crucial cases,
adequately resolved. 2 Leibniz thought that the matter of God's foreknowledge
of creaturely free acts was one such crucial case; that is, a crucial case where
his metaphysics permitted sharp formulation of the issues and led to a resolution acceptable to all Christian intellectuals of good will and sound reason.
I begin by recording some theses of philosophical theology that Leibniz
took to be non-negotiable, and, hence, shared by those Christian intellectuals
of good will and sound reason to whom his work was directed. Given our
topic the relevant theses bear on God's knowledge. He held that God is
omniscient in the sense that, for any proposition with a truth value, God
knows its truth value at all times. 3 Thus, if it is now true that I am freely
speaking then God always knew that I would now be freely speaking and,
hence, God has foreknowledge of my freely speaking, and, indeed, of every
free action of every creature. In virtue of God's perfection, his knowledge is
in every case perfect knowledge, i.e., certain, infallible and apriori.4 In virtue
of his independence from creatures, God is in no essential way dependent on
them for his knowledge of them. These requirements are satisfied in virtue
of the fact that all of God's knowledge is derived from self-knowledge, which,
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in God, is certain, infallible, and apriori. Since we may legitimately think of
God, although utterly simple, as yet having an intellect on the one hand, and
volition on the other, all of God's self-knowledge may be thought of as either
knowledge of his own intellect or knowledge of his own volition. 5 Thus, we
may usefully distinguish God's knowledge that is a consequence of his knowledge of his own volition from God's knowledge that is a consequence of his
knowledge of his own intellect. We may call the former God's post-volitional
knowledge, the latter, God's pre-volitional knowledge. Leibniz, following a
well entrenched practice, referred to the former as God's knowledge of vision,
the latter, as God's knowledge of simple intelligence. It is important to realize
that, although Leibniz utilized the terminology of knowledge of vision, he
insisted that God's so-called knowledge of vision is unlike our knowledge of
vision, since in God's case, like all God's knowledge, it is derived from
self-knowledge - see, for example, the passage quoted in footnote 5.
So much for what he took to be non-negotiable background. Now a sweeping characterization of Leibniz's contribution. Leibniz's global thesis concerning divine foreknowledge is that what needs to be said is a relatively
straightforward elaboration of the following basic idea. There is an infinite
collection of possible worlds, each represented in God's intellect by ideas
that constitute compossible complete individual concepts. 6 One of these possible worlds is actual in virtue of a single, free, world-actualizing divine
decree - this possible world shall be actual. God's knowledge of simple
intelligence consists in God's knowledge of the contents of each of these
possible worlds. God's knowledge of vision is simply the increment in his
knowledge that results when his knowledge of his own free, world- actualizing decree is added to his knowledge of simple intelligence.?
There are some elements of Leibniz's metaphysics that bear significantly
on this central global thesis. Leibniz thought of each complete individual
concept as containing properties sufficient to provide total information about
some possible individual in some possible world. Not surprisingly he held
that each complete individual concept is a member of exactly one possible
world. Surprisingly, and significantly, he held that each possible individual
is in exactly one possible world. Hence, for each possible individual x there
is exactly one complete individual concept C providing total information
about x in the one and only possible world W of which x is a member. One
of Leibniz's reasons for maintaining that each possible individual is a member
of exactly one possible world was his commitment to the thesis of superintrinsicalness, i.e., for any individual substance x and property f, if x has f,
then, for any y, were y to lack f, then y would not be x. 8 And, while Leibniz
accepted the doctrine of superintrinsicalness, my view is that he rejected a
doctrine naturally associated with it, namely, the doctrine of superessentialism, i.e., for any individual substance x and property f, if x has f, then, x has
f of necessity. I claim that Leibniz maintained a traditional distinction be-
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tween those properties that an individual has contingently and those that it
has essentially, i.e., of necessity.9 He formulated the relevant distinction by
applying the doctrine of infinite analysis to his theory of truth - the concept
containment account of truth - in the following manner: an individual x has
a property l' essentially, i.e., of necessity, just in case there is a finite analysis
of the complete individual concept C of x that yields 1'; and, an individual x
has a property l' contingently just in case there is no such analysis, but there
is an analysis of C that converges on f. \0
Three other Leibnizian doctrines that bear on our topic need to be noted
- the principle of sufficient reason, the doctrine of marks and traces, and
the principle of spontaneity. Roughly, the principle of sufficient reason is this:
for each state of affairs that obtains, there is a sufficient reason why it obtains
in just the manner in which it does obtain. The doctrine of marks and traces
is this: each state of an individual substance includes traces of all that the
substance has been and marks of all that the substance will be. And the
principle of spontaneity is this: each non-initial, non-miraculous state of a
substance is caused by some preceding state of that substance, in virtue of
which all creaturely causality is intrasubstantial. Leibniz may have taken each
of these doctrines to be a necessary truth. I I In that case each would set limits
on just what collections of properties can constitute a complete individual
concept. Some of the resulting limits bear on our topic.
II

In this section I provide a brief, spare account of one aspect of the debate
between Molina and Banez, as Leibniz understood that debate. My aim is to
highlight just those features of each theory that Leibniz viewed as unwarranted.
Let us suppose that Paul freely converted to Christ under the influence of
God's special grace. Consider then:
1)

Paul freely converted to Christ.

We may suppose that there is a collection of states of affairs Cl ... Cn that
constitutes God's causal contribution to the obtaining of the state of affairs
corresponding to 1). And we may suppose that Cn constitutes that special
grace relevant to Paul's conversion. Consider now:
2)

If C] ... Cn were to obtain then Paul would freely convert to Christ.

According to Molina, God's foreknowledge of 1) is based on God's post-volitional knowledge of his own relevant causal contributions to creation, here
represented by the obtaining of Cl ... C n , plus his knowledge of the truth of
2),12 Further, according to Molina, if the obtaining of Cl ... Cn either
metaphysically or causally necessitates Paul's conversion, then that conver-
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sion was not free.13 So, Molina held that Paul's not converting to Christ is
both metaphysically and causally compatible with God's total causal contribution to creation up to, and including, the moment of Paul's conversion,
God's special grace included. Molina concluded that the truth of 2) is not
subject to God's volition and that, hence, it is a contingent truth that it is not
known post-volitionally. It is an example of something known to God through
his middle knowledge. On Molina's account, God's knowledge of I) is based
on his post-volitional knowledge of his causal contribution to creation, plus
his knowledge of 2), through his middle knowledge.
Consider:
3)

If CI ... Cn-1 were to obtain then Paul would freely convert to Christ.

According to Banez, if the obtaining of Cj ... Cn-1 either metaphysically or
causally necessitates Paul's conversion, then that conversion was not free. 14
But, according to Banez, analogous remarks do not apply to 2), given that
Cn constitutes God's special grace, premoving Paul's will. But, of course,
God's dispensation of grace is subject to his volition. Hence, according to
Banez, God's foreknowledge of 1) is based entirely on a knowledge of his
own causal contribution to creation, and, hence, is garden-variety post-volitional knowledge - there is no need for middle knowledge, as characterized
by Molina. 15
Banez went further. He argued that middle knowledge, as required in
Molina's theory - knowledge of what a creature will do freely in various
circumstances - since it does not depend on God's volition in Molina's
theory, must depend on the relevant creature. But this consequence is contrary
to the non-negotiable requirements of an acceptable account of God's knowledge. Molina, in turn, criticized the idea that there is sometimes a premotion of
the will such that it is metaphysically impossible for that premotion to occur and
a specified choice not be made, and yet the choice in question is free.

III
In this section I begin an investigation of a topic that will occupy us throughout the paper - an assessment of Leibniz's attitude toward Molinism. It will
become clear that an accurate assessment is no easy task. This is reflected by
diverse assessments among contemporary Leibniz scholars. In a recent study
of the Monadology, Nicholas Rescher wrote:
For reconciling free agency with divine foreknowledge, Leibniz in effect
adopts the conception of middle knowledge (scientia media) deployed by the
Spanish theologian Luis Molina. 16
By contrast, in his study of the influence of Scotus's analysis of omniscience,
Douglas Langston, after noting an objection to Molinism that Leibniz reported in paragraph 41 of the Theodicy, wrote:
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Leibniz evidently takes this line of reasoning to be an effective critique of
the Molinist position. I?
For the benefit of the wary reader, I state my main conclusions on this
matter up front. Leibniz clearly rejected Molina's account of freedom, an
account that in large measure motivated Molina's appeal to middle knowledge. Leibniz also rejected the thesis that there is need for a special kind of
divine insight -the so-called supercomprehension of the free will of created
agents, as postulated by Molina - in order to account for divine knowledge
of conditionals of freedom. Nonetheless, Leibniz made an effort to provide
for a category of divine knowledge midway (so to speak) between knowledge
of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision. Moreover, Leibniz claimed
that propositions in the mid-way category are contingent and yet are not
known to God post-volitionally - a claim that Molina accepted and Banez
rejected. This accommodation to Molina is discussed in the present section;
I argue that it would have been of little interest to Molina.
In the sequel I note that Leibniz sometimes claimed that even if (perhaps,
per impossible) Molina's characterization of creaturely freedom were true,
still, Leibniz's account of the structure of possible worlds represented in the
divine understanding by collections of complete individual concepts provides
the basis for an explanation of divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom
without appeal to supercomprehension, or any other novel ingredient. So, I
reject the idea that in paragraph 41 of the Theodicy Leibniz formulated what
he there took to be an effective critique of Molinism. But I argue that a careful
scrutiny of Leibniz's alleged accommodation shows that it turns on features
of Leibniz's metaphysics that Molina would find unacceptable.
Let us concentrate on Leibniz's efforts to make room for a category of
divine knowledge between knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge
of vision. In paragraphs 14-16 of Causa Dei Leibniz characterized the difference between knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision in
terms of the modal status of the individuals that serve as the objects of each
- possibles, in the case of simple intelligence, actuals in the case of vision.
Leibniz began paragraph 17 by writing.
knowledge commonly called middle is included in knowledge of simple
intelligence when it is set forth in this sense. IS
But Leibniz. went on in paragraph 17 to note that, rather than reduce middle
knowledge to simple intelligence, we could make room for it as a separate
category of divine knowledge midway between simple intelligence and vision
by restricting the term 'knowledge of simple intelligence' to God's knowledge
of necessary truths concerning possibles, while introducing 'middle knowledge' to refer to God's knowledge of contingent truths concerning possibles.
This may appear to be a substantial concession to Molina. And there seem to
be related concessions in the offing.
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Consider the following propositions:
4)

For any proposition p, if P is necessarily true then God knows p prevolitionally.

5)

For any proposition p, if P is contingently true then God knows p postvolitionally.

4) is not in dispute among those that concern us. 5), on the other hand,
separates Molina from Banez, since Banez accepted 5) while Molina rejected
it. And the fact is that Leibniz sided with Molina in this matter and rejected
5). In his reading notes on Twisse Leibniz wrote:
Nota bene: There are certain indemonstrable truths even in the case of possibles, namely, concerning contingent items seen as possibles. 19

This passage may seem at odds with numerous other passages where Leibniz
apparently committed himself to the claim that necessary truths depend upon
the divine intellect and not the divine will, whereas contingent truths depend
upon the divine will. Thus, in the essay "Necessary and Contingent Truths,"
Leibniz wrote:
.. .just as necessary truths involve only the divine intellect, so contingent
truths involve the decrees of the wil1. 2o

An examination of Leibniz's correspondence with Arnauld suggests to me
that in passages like that just quoted Leibniz meant to affirm the following:
6)

For any proposition p, if P is contingently true then God's knowledge
of p depends upon God's knowledge of his own decrees, possible as well
as actual.

And the same examination suggests to me that Leibniz rejected the following:
7)

For any proposition p, if P is contingently true then God's knowledge
of p depends upon God's knowledge of his own actual decrees.

Leibniz held that concepts of possible, but non-actual individuals included
possible, but non-actual divine decrees, i.e., decrees that God would have
actually made had he created the possible worlds to which the individuals in
question belong. But since these possible decrees are included in the relevant
concepts, i.e., in God's ideas, he knows them by simple intelligence, i.e.,
pre-volitionally.21
We may locate the central point here by focusing on some remarks in
Leibniz's reading notes on Dole's De modo conjunctionis concursuum Dei et
creaturarum (Lyon, 1634), concerning that famous test case utilized in so
many treatises on middle knowledge - the question whether the residents of
Keilah would have surrendered David to Saul, had David remained in Keilah
and had Saul besieged Keilah. Leibniz noted that when we consider whether
the residents of Keilah would have turned David over to Saul, had David
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taken refuge in Keilah and had Saul then besieged the city, we must consider
truths about possible residents of Keilah other than the actual residents of
Keilah. 22 In particular, we must consider possible but non-actual residents of
Keilah whose concepts include the property of living in Keilah during David's
refuge therein when Keilah was besieged by Saul. Let Dominic be one such,
and let cDominic be his complete individual concept. A relevant question is:
does cDominic include the property of playing a role in turning David over
to Saul? Leibniz would argue that the analysis that establishes the answer to
this question is infinite. Hence Dominic has (or lacks) the property of playing
a role in turning David over to Saul contingently. But since Dominic never
is actual there is no actual decree of God that is relevant to whether Dominic
has the relevant property. Hence, 5) and 7) must be rejected. But, according
to Leibniz, there is always some possible divine decree that is relevant to
whether some possible individual has some property contingently. Hence 6)
is acceptable. 23
There is nothing in this accommodation that would have been welcomed
by Molina. Molina would have seen Leibniz's so-called accommodation as
reflecting unacceptable idiosyncrasies in Leibniz's metaphysics that are irrelevant to the central point at issue here - how God can have foreknowledge
of the free actions of creatures that is self-knowledge without God's bringing
about the action in question in such fashion as to render it non-free. Notice,
in particular, that Leibniz's grounds for denying 5) (at least, according to my
exposition) are consistent with affirming that each free choice of a creature
is such that, given God's causal contribution to creation prior to that choice,
it is physically necessary that just that choice be made - a position that is
deterministic in a way that even Banez would reject.
Note that there are two separate points here. There is the claim that Leibniz's so-called accommodation is irrelevant to the central topic; and there is
the claim that it turns on unacceptable idiosyncrasies in Leibniz's metaphysics. I close this section by discussing the latter charge.
Leibniz would have claimed that the so-called "idiosyncrasies in his metaphysics" are required in order to formulate an acceptable philosophical theology. One point, in particular, is worth noting. In his reading notes on
Twisse's Scientia Media Leibniz agreed with Twisse that Suarez's alleged
proof that God foreknows future contingents is unacceptable, because circular. According to Twisse, Suarez argued that propositions about future contingents are known to God because they are knowable and God, in his
omniscience, knows whatever is knowable. But, according to Twisse, Suarez
had no ground for affirming that propositions about future contingents are
knowable other than the claim that they are known by God. By contrast,
Twisse, here in accord with Banez, argued that propositions about future
contingents are known to God because he has, from all eternity, willed them
to be true.24
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In his reading notes, Leibniz commented on Twisse's strategy as follows:
But in this matter Twisse himself does not satisfy because he holds that the
[divine] decree is the basis (rationem) of its [the obtaining of some future
contingent state of affairs] knowability. It is the efficient cause, but not the
formal cause. The formal cause is the connection of terms, i.e., that the
predicate is in the subject, ... 25
Leibniz recorded a similar remark in the same reading notes, commenting on a
point Twisse ascribed to Cajetan in the latter's commentary on article 13 of
question 14 of the first part of St. Thomas's Summa The%gica, i.e., the question
whether God's knowledge extends to future contingents. Cajetan's point is
this: future contingents are not knowable on the basis of indeterminate, impedable causes, but they are available to God's omniscience because God knows
which causes are impeded and which are not. Leibniz commented that since
God knows future contingents prior to creation, when the relevant un- impeded causes did not even exist, " ...the origin of the eternal knowability of the
futurity of contingents must be sought from another source."26 And that source
is relevant cases of concept inclusion, as known to God in the divine intellect.

IV
We have noted Leibniz's major critical theme with respect to Molina and
Banez. It is this. In order to satisfy the non-negotiable requirements concerning
divine foreknowledge and creaturely freedom, shared by Christian intellectuals
of good will and sound reason, Molina and Banez each introduced a novel theory.
Molina introduced the theory of middle knowledge; Banez, the theory of an
immediate premotion of the will. Leibniz's central point is that neither is needed;
his own theory satisfies the non-negotiable requirements without employing
these novel components - indeed, without employing any novel components not
otherwise required by a sound metaphysics. What we need now is some detail.
Leibniz's major critical reaction to Banez is contained in the opening passages of paragraph 47 of the Theodicy, where Leibniz wrote:
There is no need to resort, with some new Thomists, to a new, immediate
predetermination from God, which brings it about that the free creature abandons its indifference, and to a decree from God for predetermining it, which
provides God the means of knowing what it will do; for it suffices that the
creature is predetermined by its preceding state, which inclines it to one
course more than to another...
On the basis of this passage the naive reader might suppose that Leibniz was
a compatibilist and determinist with respect to creaturely free choice, and
that he utilized his compatibilism with respect to causal determination and
free choice to solve apparent problems concerning the compatibility of divine
foreknowledge and human freedom. With some caveats this naive reading is the
one I recommend.
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Of the three notions involved here - compatibilism, freedom, and determinism - the latter presents numerous problems in the 17th century contextY Moreover, there are special difficulties that accrue in virtue of features
of Leibniz's metaphysics. Here is an example. There is general agreement
that Leibniz held that some actions of some creatures are free in virtue of
occurring as a result of free choices of the relevant creatures. So those who
do not ascribe compatibilism to Leibniz claim that he held that free choices
are not determined, in the relevant sense. Yet the texts make clear that Leibniz
subscribed to the thesis of superintrinsicalness. Applied to the case in hand,
superintrinsicalness has the following consequence: suppose x is a creature
who makes free choice c at time t; then had x not made choice c at t, x would
never have existed in the first place. That sounds like strong determination.
Those who deny that Leibniz was a compatibilist and determinist must say
that this is not a relevant notion of determination. I am inclined to believe
that anyone who thinks that determination in this sense is compatible with
freedom, should have no difficulty accepting the compability of more garden
variety notions of determination with freedom. Still, to be fair, we need a
notion of determination characterized in terms of natural causation. Here is
a rough characterization that will serve, I believe. A non-initial state S of a
creature x is naturally determined if there is a sequence of natural conditions,
the first of which is the initial state of x, and the last of which is S, where
each element in the sequence is a state of x that is a causally sufficient
condition of its successor in the sequence, with the exception of S, which has
no successor in the sequence. My claim is that Leibniz's mature, settled
opinion was that some free choices of some creatures are determined according to this characterization. We might call it natural determination. Note that
I have concentrated on Leibniz's conception of a free choice rather than his
conception of a free action. My reason for that is that Leibniz believed that
free choice is where the action is when it comes to freedom. In particular,
Leibniz saw the inadequacy of the idea that an action is free just in case that
action is caused (in part) by a choice of the agent in such fashion that the
action would not have occurred had the agent chosen otherwise. Commenting
on a characterization of freedom drawn along these lines Leibniz wrote in a
letter to Basnage (G/3/133):
Mr. JaqueJot ... says that freedom signifies a power to do what one wills,
because one wills it in such fashion that if one had not willed it, one would
not do it ... I believe that the most obstinate adversaries of human freedom
are obliged to agree that we are free in this sense. I do not know, if even
Spinoza would deny it.

In the New Essays (A/6/6/1S1), commentating on essentially the same notion
of a free action, Leibniz wrote:
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The question is not whether a man can do what he wills to do, but whether
his will itself is sufficiently independent.
It is natural to suppose that Leibniz held that the will is "sufficiently
independent" for freedom, although naturally determined. The determinist
claim appears to be a straightforward consequence of Leibniz's principle of
spontaneity.28 Here is a carefully crafted version of the principle of spontaneity, formulated by Leibniz in the correspondence with Arnauld:

Everything happens in each substance in consequence of the first state that
God gave it in creating it, and, extraordinary concourse aside, his ordinary
concourse consists simply in the conservation of the substance itself, in conformity with its preceding state and with the changes that it carries with it. 29
I am supposing that Leibniz held that the changes that the preceding state of
a substance "carries with it" ('changemens qu' il porte') are, in the case of
God's ordinary concourse, brought about by natural causation, even in the case
of free choices. 30 There are numerous texts that would naturally suggest this
supposition to the naive reader (of whom I have already confessed to be one).31
However, there are a number of considerations that point in another direction, suggesting that Leibniz was an incompatibilist who accepted some libertarian version of agency theory. There are a number of texts favoring this
interpretation, none more egregious (from my point of view) than the following from "Necessary and Contingent Truths":
Free or intelligent substances have something greater [than stones] and more
marvelous in a kind of imitation of God, so that they are not bound by any
certain subordinate laws of the universe, but act as if by a private miracle,
on the sole spontaneity of their own power, and, in consideration of some
final cause, they interrupt the nexus and course of efficient causes on their
own will. So it is true that there is no creature that knows the heart who could
predict with certainty how some mind will choose in accordance with the
laws of nature .... From this it can be understood what is that indifference
that goes with freedom. Just as contingency is opposed to metaphysical
necessity, so indifference excludes not only metaphysical but also physical
necessity.32
It is at once the comfort and bane of exegetical scholarship that no matter
what the text, there is almost always some room to maneuver, if some pet
interpretation is at stake. And, there really is room to maneuver here. Nonetheless, all things considered, if I thought that this passage represented Leibniz's mature, settled view, I would be inclined to throw in the towel.
Note that whatever account of freedom Leibniz intended to promote in this
passage, he claimed as a consequence of it that no creature supplied with
knowledge of the relevant initial conditions and with knowledge of the laws
of nature " ... could predict with certainty how some mind will choose." There
are other passages where Leibniz made essentially the same point. 33 In these
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passages Leibniz maintained that, at least for most of us, most of the time,
whatever the circumstances that obtain prior to our making a decision, we
can, if we choose, suspend our deliberative process and make no decision.
Leibniz then argued that this power of suspension of the deliberative process
makes it impossible for a created mind, unaided by God, to know infallibly
in advance what a free agent will do. 34 The idea that we have this power of
suspending deliberation survives in Leibniz's writing after 1700, but the
thesis that it produces unpredictability is not to be found. Indeed, the relevant
texts seem to suggest that Leibniz then regarded suspension as causally ordered in much the same fashion as any other choice is.35
The real difficulty presented by the "private miracle" passage is the claim
that free creatures may " .. .interrupt the ... course of efficient causes," and
that therefore freedom consists not only in a lack of metaphysical necessity,
but, more significantly, in an indifference that results from a lack of physical
necessity. And it is exactly this claim that by my lights, Leibniz denied in his
writings on freedom after 1700. Thus, in the preface to the Theodicy, touting
the virtues of what was to come, Leibniz wrote:
It will be shown that absolute necessity, which is called also logical and
metaphysical, and sometimes geometric, and which alone is to be feared,
does not exist in free actions, and, hence, that freedom is exempt not only
from constraint, but also from real necessity. [G/6/37(Huggard 61), underlining mine.]

This is not a stray passage; its point occurs in numerous other texts - as a
small sample, see T §§ 44, 302, 367; G/3/40l(A+G 194); and Grua 480-81.
I take Leibniz's point to be that only metaphysical necessity, not natural
necessity, serves as a threat to freedom; that is, that natural, or physical
necessity, unlike metaphysical necessity, is compatible with freedom.
The exegetical scholar who ascribes libertarianism to Leibniz may be unmoved by this passage and my gloss on it, noting that it is a question of
exactly what is said to have or to lack necessity. I take the following passage
from a 1707 letter from Leibniz to Coste on freedom to come close to settling
the matter my way:
When we propose a choice to ourselves, for example, whether to leave or
not, it is a question whether, with all the circumstances, internal or external,
motives, perceptions, dispositions, impressions, passions, inclinations taken
together, I am still in a state of contingency, or whether I am necessitated to
take the choice to leave, for example, i.e., whether in fact this true and
determined proposition - in all these circumstances taken together, I will
choose to leave - is contingent or necessary. I reply that it is contingent,
because neither I nor any other more enlightened mind could demonstrate
that the opposite of this truth implies a contradiction. And assuming that by
freedom of indifference we understand a freedom opposed to necessity (as I
have just explained it), I agree with that freedom.36
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Note that in order for the choice to be free Leibniz herein required only
that the relevant conditional lack metaphysical necessity. There is no requirement that it lack physical necessity. And the clear suggestion of the passage
(and the entire letter) is that that is all the indifference Leibniz was then
prepared to admit. 37
I am aware that the compatibilism that I ascribe to Leibniz was an uncommon view in his time. Arnauld strongly criticized Malebranche for holding
that an action might be free and yet " ... a necessary consequence of the order
of nature ... "38 Arnauld associated the thesis that all creaturely actions are a
necessary consequence of the order of nature, " ... a necessary consequence of
natural laws ... " with the heresy of John Wyclyf.39
I think that it is instructive that Leibniz had a quite different reading of
Wyclyf; at T § 67 he wrote:
I am very far from the views of Bradwardine, Wyclyf, Hobbes and Spinoza,
who advocate, so it seems, this entirely mathematical necessity...

So Leibniz deplored the necessity he took Wyclyf to have advocated in
connection with the actions of creatures, and he would have agreed with
Arnauld that necessity as understood by Wyc1yf is not compatible with freedom, but the notion of necessity deplored is not the one Arnauld had in mind.
I am inclined to put matters this way: Leibniz saw more clearly than those
Christian philosophers who were his contemporaries or who preceded him
that a deep understanding of the elements of Christian philosophical theology
yields a series of serious problems concerning the claim that some states of
affairs obtain contingently. He thought that we ought to devote our intellectual energy to solving those problems and then utilize natural compatibilism
to finesse less threatening concerns. 40

v
Leibniz focused his critical attention on two aspects of Molina's account: i)
Molina's conception of the conditions required for a creaturely action to be
free; and ii) Molina's theory of the foundation of God's knowledge of 2) and
its ilk, i.e., what came to be called God's supercomprehension of the free,
created will.
i) On Molina on Freedom.
Consider the account of freedom Molina offered in Disputation 2 of the Concordia:
... that agent is said to be free, who, all the requisites for acting having been
posited, can act or not act, or so perform one action that he is still able to do
the contrary.41

In notes concerning a conversation on the topic of the problem of evil, after
a careful formulation of the principle of sufficient reason, Leibniz set out to
criticize Molina's account of freedom. He wrote:
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This notion of freedom - that is, the power of acting or not acting, all the
requisites for acting having been posited, and all things being equal both in
the object and in the agent, is an impossible chimera, which is contrary to
the first principle that I stated. 42

Then, after claiming that this account of freedom is not to be found in Aristotle, Augustine, the Master of Sentences, Thomas, Scotus, and most of the
older Scholastics, he added:
It was given currency for the first time by the later Scholastics. 43

In an earlier version Leibniz wrote 'by the Molinists' in place of 'by the later
Scholastics.' There is no doubt that we are in the neighborhood of his major
objection to Molina's libertarian account of freedom. And the objection is
straightforward: The principle of sufficient reason implies that the conditions
required for freedom by Molina can not be satisfied and, hence, that the
Molinist account of freedom is inconsistent.
Leibniz often formulated this criticism by stating that the Molinist conception of freedom requires an indifference of equipoise, which is inconsistent
with Lhe principle of sufficient reason.44 It is easy to suppose that Leibniz's
criticism misses the mark here. A comparison of Molina's conception of
freedom, as formulated in the Concordia, with the account attributed to him
by Leibniz, shows that they differ in that Molina's account contains no mention of equipoise, i.e., of all things being equal in the object and the agent
- precisely the point on which Leibniz appears to have focused his criticism.
But I think an examination of some of Leibniz's most carefully crafted criticisms shows that the target is Molina's account of freedom, unfettered by a
requirement of equipoise. Leibniz characterized a sufficient cause or reason
for the obtaining of some state of affairs a. as a total set of requisites for the
obtaining of a.. The principle of sufficient reason requires that, if a. obtains,
there is a sufficient cause or reason why it obtains. Leibniz also held that if
a sufficient reason or cause for some state of affairs a. obtained, then a.
obtains. Put these items together with Molina's characterization of freedom
and it is clear why Leibniz regarded it as an impossible chimera. The equipoise feature is irrelevant to this criticism. Perhaps, when Leibniz leaned on
the equipoise feature in his criticism of Molina's account of freedom, what
he had in mind is this: Molina's account of freedom implies the possibility
of equipoise; but, since equipoise is impossible, Molina's account of freedom
is unacceptable. 45

ii) On Molina on God's Supercomprehension of the Created Will.
In paragraph 41 of the Theodicy, Leibniz considered some of the standard
objections to middle knowledge, as employed by Molina. He wrote:

LEIBNIZ ON DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE

561

... the principal objection goes against the foundation of this knowledge. For
what foundation can God have for seeing what the residents of Keilah would
do? A simple, contingent and free act has nothing in itself that can provide
a principle of certainty, unless it is regarded as predetermined by the decrees
of God, and by the causes that depend on them .... Therefore, it would be
necessary to reduce everything to the predetermination of the decrees of God,
and, hence, this middle knowledge (so it will be said) will remedy nothing.
It is tempting to suppose that Leibniz was not only reporting a standard
objection to Molina's understanding of middle knowledge, i.e., the objection
that there can be no such knowledge because there is no foundation for it but subscribing to it as well. The same objection appears to surface in other
passages, where Leibniz was stating his own position. After noting that King's
account of freedom involves unacceptable indifference, Leibniz wrote:
He [King] is also greatly embarrassed with respect to the foreknowledge of
God. For if the soul is perfectly indifferent in its choice, how is it possible
to foresee this choice, and what sufficient reason can be found for the knowledge of a thing, if there is none for its existence?46
But these passages must be contrasted with those in which Leibniz seemed
to claim that even if the human will were subject to unacceptable indifference,
of the variety Leibniz took Molina and King to advocate, still Leibniz's
account of the structure of possible worlds represented in the divine understanding by collections of complete individual concepts would provide an
acceptable basis for middle knowledge. Consider two samples. The first is
from paragraph 42 of the Theodicy. After touting the virtues of his way of
thinking about possible worlds, Leibniz wrote:
For even if it were true and possible that future contingents that consist in
the free actions of reasonable creatures were entirely independent of the
decrees of God and of external causes, there would be a means of foreseeing
them: for God would see them just as they are in the region of possibles,
before he would decree to admit them to existence.
And consider the following passage from paragraph 364 of the Theodicy,
where Leibniz had his final say on Molinism in the Theodicy:
... the Socinians can not be excused for denying to God certain knowledge
of future matters, and especially the future decisions of a free creature. For
even though they supposed that there is a freedom of complete indifference,
so that the will can choose without ground [sujet], and that thus this effect
could not be seen in its cause (which is a great absurdity), they must always
consider that God was able to foresee this event in the idea of the possible
world that he decided to create.
I think that Leibniz was simply reporting an objection in paragraph 41 of
the Theodicy, and not subscribing to it. I offer two pieces of evidence, neither
anywhere near conclusive. First, in the very next paragraph - as our quotation
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displays - Leibniz took what appears to be a quite different position. Second,
the 'so it will be said' in parentheses is a standard device that Leibniz employed to indicate that he was just reportingY The passage quoted from
Leibniz's commentary on King is more troublesome. My suggestion is that
when Leibniz posed the questions " ... how is it possible to foresee this choice,
and what sufficient reason can be found for the knowledge ... " he was repeating himself -- in essence, asking just one question. Leibniz wrote:
... to know something is to know the truth of a proposition, and indeed to
know the truth of a proposition is to know why it will be thus. Therefore, if
God perfectly foresees a thing, he will foresee not only what will be, but why
it will be ... 48

Leibniz formulated the point as a criticism of the theory advocated by Molina
in paragraph 320 of the Theodicy. For Leibniz, perfect knowledge of a truth
- the kind of knowledge God has - involves knowledge of why that proposition is true. But given Molina's account of freedom, Leibniz argued, there
would be truths where there is no account of why these propositions are true.
But that criticism is simply a repeat of Leibniz's big criticism that Molina's
account of freedom is inconsistent with the principle of sufficient reason. If,
per impossible (as Leibniz would put it), Molina's libertarian theory is correct, then there may be truths where there is no sufficient reason to know,
and, hence, so far, no separate objection to Molina's account of God's foreknowledge of the likes of 2). And, indeed, I take it that in paragraphs 42 and
364 of the Theodicy, quoted above, Leibniz claimed he had the conceptual
apparatus to account for the relevant middle knowledge, even if, per impossible, Molina"s libertarian theory were true. Let's see.
Consider the following:
8)

Had David remained in Keilah and had Saul besieged Keilah, then Luis
(the mayor of Keilah) would have freely chosen to tum David over to
Saul.

Suppose that 8) is true and that Molina's libertarian account of freedom is
correct. Still, according to Leibniz in paragraph 42, he can account for God's
knowledge of 8) without appeal to anything other than what is required in
order to account for any item of God's knowledge of simple intelligence.
Leibniz wrote:
For this result I come to my principle of an infinity of possible worlds,
represented ... in the divine intelligence, where all future conditionals must
be included. For the case of the siege of Keilah is part of a possible world
that differs from ours only in all that is connected with this hypothesis, and
the idea of this possible world represents what would happen in this case.

We might think of this as Leibniz's loose and popular account of divine
knowledge of counterfactual conditionals of freedom such as 8). It seems to
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go this way. Let Wactual be the initial segment of the actual world from
creation through David's decision not to remain in Keilah. Let WI be an initial
segment of a possible world Wi, where WI and Wactual are exactly alike with
respect to hard facts except that in WI David decides to remain in Keilah, and
Saul besieges Keilah and any other changes required by these assumptions.
Leibniz's loose and popular account appears to assume that there is just one
possible world - Wi - that has as initial segment the hard facts of WI. And
God knows whether 8) is true simply by noting whether Luis freely chooses
to turn David over to Saul in Wi - a simple matter of God's taking heed of
the complete individual concept of Luis, or his stand-in in Wi.
Molina would object to this construction, insisting that there are two distinct possible worlds Wi and Wj, each with initial segments WI and Wj that
are alike with respect to hard facts, i.e., each like Wactual except that in each
David decides to remain in Keilah and Saul besieges Keilah. Luis freely
chooses to turn David over to Saul in one, and freely chooses to do otherwise
in the other. And, indeed, this situation is what generates the need for middle
knowledge, since God's knowledge of simple intelligence, - his knowledge
of what each individual does in each possible world - leaves it unsettled
whether 8) is true or false.
Leibniz would respond to Molina's objection by maintaining that the doctrine of marks and traces precludes the existence of two possible worlds alike
up to and including David's decision to remain in Keilah and Saul's besieging
Keilah, and differing thereafter with respect to what Luis freely chooses to
do with respect to David and Saul. The doctrine of marks and traces - in
the strong form required to serve Leibniz's purposes here - is intimately
related to the thesis of superintrinsicalness. Perhaps, they are equivalent in
the presence of other doctrines Leibniz accepted. 49 But, in an obvious way,
acceptance of the thesis of superintrinsicalness raises problems about what
sense, if any, Leibniz can ascribe to counterfactuals like 8). So the very
conceptual tools that Leibniz would have deployed in order to firm up his
loose and popular account of God's knowledge of 8) raise serious questions
concerning what sense, if any, Leibniz can ascribe to 8). One would expect
that there is a strict and philosophical account of the matter somewhere in
the Leibnizian texts. There is; it is the subject of the next section.

VI
Let's engage in some damage control. We know the general thesis that Leibniz
liked with respect to divine knowledge. It is this: God's knowledge is the
union of his knowledge of simple intelligence and his knowledge of vision,
where the latter results from the former by adding to it God's knowledge of
his own world - actualizing decree. By Leibniz's lights it is only counterfactual conditionals that threaten the general thesis. He would claim that
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factual conditionals, including factual conditionals of freedom, pose no special problem at all. We might expect him to bite the bullet at this point and
argue that his metaphysics establishes that counterfactual conditionals are
without sense and that, hence, the general thesis survives, utterly unscathed.
That was not his course, and I think it is clear why. The costs with respect
to his own orthodoxy and his church reunion project were simply too high.
Leibniz noted that sacred scripture takes counterfactual conditionals, and
divine knowledge thereof, seriously, including I Samuel, chapter 23 verses
11 and 12, i.e., the classic case involving David, Saul, and the ungrateful
residents of Keilah. 50 Not to do the same was not a viable option, given
Leibniz's eforts to be orthodox and his church reunion goals.
Consider the following passage from Leibniz's reading notes on Twisse, in
which his strict and philosophical account of counterfactual conditionals is
on display:
Very often, future conditionals are senseless things. Thus, if I ask what would
have happened if Peter had not denied Christ, I am asking what would happen
if Peter were not Peter, for denying is contained in the complete concept of
Peter. Nevertheless it is excusable that, on this occasion, by the name Peter
is understood what is involved in those things [attributes of Peter] from which
the denial does not follow, and at the same time there is subtracted from the
entire universe all those things from which it does follow. And then sometimes
it can happen that a decision follows per se from the remaining things posited
in the universe. But sometimes it does not follow unless a new divine decree
occurs based on the rule of the best. If there is no natural chain or succession
from the remaining things posited, then it is not possible to know what will
happen except on the basis of a decree of God in accord with what is best.
Therefore. the matter depends either on the series of causes, or on a decree
of the divine will. They do not seem to gain anything at all by means of
middle knowledge. 51

There is much that might be said about this striking passage, concerning
Leibniz's reconstruction of counterfactual conditionals. Our focus is on its
implications for Leibniz's account of God's knowledge of those conditionals.
As the last sentence of the quotation suggests, there is nothing here to mollify
the Molinist. After removing relevant items from Peter's complete concept
and making associated adjustments to our conception of the rest of the universe, we first determine whether what remains is sufficient to causally determine a truth value for the consequent of the relevant conditional; if not,
then we need to know what God would have willed in those circumstances.
Of course, it is likely to be temerarious for us to say what God would have
willed in those circumstances; but it is God's knowledge that concerns us
here, not ours. The clear implication of Leibniz's reconstruction seems to be
that God's knowledge of contingent counterfactual conditionals about actual
individuals -- including contingent counterfactual conditionals of freedom
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- is post-volitional in the sense that it depends either on God's knowledge
of his actual decrees (which determine the causal connections in the world)
or on his knowledge of what he would have willed in various counterfactual
circumstances. 52
Nor is there anything here of benefit to the Banezian. There is no reason
at all to suppose that in the case where determination of a truth value for a
counterfactual conditional requires knowledge of what God would have decreed, Leibniz had in mind anything like a premotion as postulated by Banez.
More likely, Leibniz had in mind a divine decree of a natural law to cover
the gaps engendered by Leibniz's recipe for making sense of contingent
counterfactual conditionals.
This completes my survey of Leibniz on divine foreknowledge. No doubt
there is more to be said, particularly concerning Leibniz's conception of the
relation of God's knowledge to God's concurrence in creaturely actions. And
there are topics delineated in this paper that deserve a more thorough treatment, e.g., the place of possible free decrees in Leibniz's thought, his conception of human freedom, and his claim that a divine decree may be the
efficient cause, but not the formal cause of the knowability [scibilitatis] of a
future contingent proposition. 53
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possible world,' where 'this' is taken as referring to the actual world. So construed, Leibniz
believed that the proposition thereby expressed is true. It is crucial to one of his main
strategies for preserving contingency that the proposition thereby expressed is contingent.
But Leibniz was sharply opposed to the idea that what is best is subject to God's willsee, for example, OM § 2. Hence, it is central to one of Leibniz's main strategies for
preserving contingency that there are contingent propositions whose truth values are not
subject to God's actual will.
24. See Guilelmus Twisse. Dissertatio de scientia media. Arnhem, 1639: 248. For
Leibniz's reading notes, see Grua 35l.
25. Grua 351. The same point may be found in LHI XVIII, 31.
26. Grua 353.
27. The notion of a determination of a truth-value for a proposition (or the obtaining
of a state of affairs) was used in a bewildering variety of ways in the 17th century. In
Leibniz's case (which is not atypical), it is important to distinguish among theological,
semantical, conceptual, metaphysical, and physical determinations - at a minimum. Not
to do so - to barge in unarmed with the relevant distinctions - is likely to yield a farrago.
28. For a critique of the view I support here and an ingenious defense of an alternative
understanding of Leibniz, see R. Cranston Paull, "Leibniz and The Miracle of Freedom,"
Nous, Vol. XXVI, No.2, June, 1992: 218-235.
29. LA 91-92.

30. For Cranston Paull's subtle alternative reading, see op. cit.: 228-29.
31. See, for example, G/6/37 (Huggard 61); T §§ 43, 305, 360, 369; G/3/401 (A+G
194); Grua 482.
32. C20-21 (MP 100-10 1).
33. See C20 (MP 100), and also Grua 301,385-86, and Causa Dei 105.
34. See the texts noted in footnote 33. Grua 385-86 contains a particularly complex
treatment of this issue.
35. See, for example, N6/6/195-96; Grua 480-481; G/6/413 (Huggard 418).
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36.0/3/401 (A+O 194). Of course I would have been happier if in place of ' .. .it is
contingent, because neither I nor any other more enlightened mind could demonstrate that
the opposite of this truth implies a contradiction,' Leibniz had written - it is contingent,
because its opposite does not imply a contradiction. But philosophers do not write with
an eye to making life easy for subsequent historians.
37. I think that Leibniz's frequent remarks about choices always being brought about
by motives that incline without necessitating also point to the same conclusion. It is clear
that the necessitating that is claimed not to ensue is metaphysical necessitating. Moreover,
it is clear that Leibniz was not just making the claim that it is not metaphysically necessary
that the choice occur; he was claiming that the conditional - if agent S has motives
m I ... mn in circumstances K then S makes choice C - is not metaphysically necessary.
See, for example, a letter of Leibniz to Jaquelot (0/6/571), paragraph 8 of Leibniz's fifth
letter to Clarke (0/7/390 (ed. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence,57» and
NE 175, 178-79, for some conflfmation. Furthermore, it seems equally clear that in these
passages Leibniz assumed that metaphysical necessitating is all the necessitating that
needs to be warded off in order to preserve freedom.
38. Oeuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld... , Paris: 1775-1783. Reprint. Brussels, Culture
et Civilisation., 1967: vol. 39, page 301.

39. Ibid., p. 316. I am indebted to Professor Elmar Kremer for bringing these passages
to my attention.
40. There is a deep and penetrating discussion of these issues in Michael J. Murray,
"The Second Leibnizian Labyrinth: Psychology, Theology, and Freedom," his Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1991. Murray, like Paull, comes to a different
conclusion from the one I am advocating. See his article "Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom," forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological' Research.
41. Concordia 14.
42. C25.
43. Ibid., In criticizing the same formulation of Molina's account of freedom, Banez noted
that it is not to be found in Aristotle, the Master of Sentences, or Thomas. See Tractatus 357.
44. Here is a small sample of texts where Leibniz made this claim: N6131132, 0/l/148
(L204), Orua 276-77, N211/Sl4-15, 0/3/402(A+0 194), Orua 479, and 0/2/420, where
Leibniz wrote to the Jesuit, Des Bosses:
I maintain absolutely that the power of determining oneself without a cause,
i.e., without a source of the determination, implies a contradiction just as a
relation without a foundation implies a contradiction. But, from this, the
metaphysical necessity of every effect does not follow. For it suffices that
the caus<! or reason not be metaphysically necessitating, although it is
metaphysically necessary that there be such a cause.
45. There may be features in Molina's metaphysics that imply the possibility of
equipoise, but his account of freedom has no such implication.
46. 0/6/434 (Huggard 439-440).
47. A famous case occurs in DM 13 where Leibniz set out to meet the objection that if
the concept of each individual substance is complete then each individual substance has
all its properties necessarily.
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48. VE 71 (LH IV 6, 12fB 14). The same point is a crucial premiss in Leibniz's argument
against middle knowledge in "Scientia Media," see C25.
49. For a discussion of these issues, see Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, chapter six.
50. See, for example, LH I XVIII, 22.
51. Grua 358. The underlining is mine. The words underlined, i.e., 'from which it does
follow,' are offered in place of 'ex quibus non sequitur.' You don't need to know much
Latin to have reservations about my offering, as a translation. I am supposing that Leibniz
miswrote and that his intention is captured by my replacement. This passage is translated
by Benson Mates in "Individuals and Modality in the Philosophy of Leibniz," Studia
Leibni{iana, 1972, p. I05. Mates translates the relevant phrase as I do and says ofLeibniz's
version " ... this, so far as I can see, must be an error." My hope was that the error belonged
to the editor Gaston Grua, but an inspection of the original, handwritten text has convinced
me that the error belongs to Leibniz. You may think that it belongs to Mates and Sleigh.
52. This aspect of Leibniz's treatment of counterfactual conditionals may be elaborated
in at least two ways. First, we may assume his view to be that from all eternity God willed
that were such and such conditions actual then such and such laws would obtain, or,
second, we may assume his view to be that from all eternity God knew that were such and
such conditions actual then he would have willed that such and such laws obtain. On either
alternative God's knowledge of the truth of a counterfactual conditional of freedom is
self-knowledge in the relevant sense.
53. What I know about Molina and Banez I learned from Fred Freddoso at the University
of Notre Dame. If I did not get it straight, the fault rests with the student, not the teacher.
I also express my gratitude to the following colleagues who discussed these matters with
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and Brian Skelly. I am grateful to the following who read and criticized early versions of
the paper: Jan Cover, Graeme Hunter, and Michael Murray. Aspects of early versions of
the paper were presented to the Philosophy Department at Columbia University, and to
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